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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and the US 
banking performance. Unconventional monetary policy is captured through the central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves. Results show that unconventional monetary policy has a negative 
relationship with bank performance. Further analysis shows that the negative association 
between unconventional monetary policy and performance is mitigated for banks with a high 
level of asset diversification and low deposit funding. We also find that the negative 
relationship between unconventional monetary policy and performance subdues for deposit 
insured financial institutions. Finally, we use dynamic panel threshold analysis which reveals 
that the negative association between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance 
is particularly pronounced above the reported threshold value.  
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1. Introduction 
Responding to the financial meltdown in 2008, the Federal Reserve (Fed) in the US has been 
actively engaged in monetary expansion of immense proportions. Only as part of the Fed’s 
large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) programmes, trillions of the US long-term Treasury 
bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were purchased over the 2008-2013 period. It 
does not come as a surprise, therefore, that a lot of emphasis has been placed by academics 
and policy makers alike on understanding the impact of unconventional monetary policy 
(Joyce et al., 2012; Miles, 2014; Svensson, 2014). Along these lines, there has been a 
growing literature that examines the effect of interest rates on the risk-taking of banks (Delis 
et al., 2011; Altunbas et al., 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 
2015). This paper tries to bridge a gap in the existing literature by examining the underlying 
relationship between the unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), as measured by central 
bank’s assets and excess reserves, and the performance of the US commercial and saving 
banks controlling for bank-specific and country-level variables. 
Although, there is a large volume of empirical literature regarding the broader economic 
impact of UMPs, there is rather limited evidence with regards to the relationship between 
UMPs and bank performance (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). 
Mostly, since the first round of the Fed’s asset purchases in 2008, numerous studies offer 
explanations on the effectiveness of UMPs on asset prices, interest rates and a number of 
other macroeconomic variables (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012; 
Wright et al., 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Swanson et al., 2014; Rogers 
et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015). Some studies employ high frequency data and look at the 
impact of the Fed policy announcements on long term interest rates (Krishnamurthy and 
Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright et al.,  2012; Swanson et al., 2014) sovereign 
yields, stock prices and foreign exchange rates (Rogers et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015). 
Other studies look at the impact of UMPs on output and inflation (Kapetanios et al., 2012; 
Chen et al., 2012). Some other studies also investigate the association between UMPs and 
financial stability (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek (2013) examine the effect of UMPs on corporate risk for commercial and 
investment banks over the 2008-2011 period. They conclude that UMPs increase corporate 
risk for the period under study. Similarly, Chodorow-Reich (2014) examines the effect of 
UMPs on risk-taking for a sample of insurers, and mutual funds from 2008 to 2013 period. 
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The author finds some evidence of positive association between UMP and risk for the 2010-
2013 period. The reported positive impact of UMP on bank risk-taking lends empirical 
support to the ‘portfolio balance’ channel that is introduced by Tobin (1963, 1969).2   
Turning now to the effect of UMPs on bank performance this could be explained through its 
impact on bank’s interest margins which is an important source of bank profitability. Bank’s 
interest margin reflects the net interest income that arises from the difference between the 
short term (deposit) rate and long term (lending) rate (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). When the 
Fed has initiated UMPs, the short term interest rate has already reached the zero lower 
bounds. Furthermore, expansionary monetary policies decrease long term interest rates 
consistent with previous empirical studies (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et 
al., 2012; Wright et al., 2012; Swanson et al., 2014). Therefore, a reduction in the long term 
interest rates due to UMPs would decrease the difference between these long term interest 
rates and the short term interest rates that would consequently supress the interest margins. 
The extant literature points to two channels that UMPs, particularly LSAPs, could reduce 
long term interest rates. One is the ‘portfolio balance’ channel according to which the Fed’s 
LSAPs could affect the long term interest rates through the reduction of the amount of long-
term assets that the private sector holds (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2012). The second 
is the ‘signalling’ channel through which LSAPs could signal to market participants that the 
Fed has changed its views on policy preferences. This in turn might change bond investors’ 
expectations of the future short term interest rate resulting in lengthening the period of the 
near-zero federal fund rate. The ‘signalling’ channel would decrease long term bond yields 
by reducing the average expected short-rate which is component of the long term rates (Bauer 
and Rudebusch, 2013).  
However, the empirical evidence on the effect of UMP on bank profitability is rather scarce. 
In particular, we know of only two studies that focus on the underlying relationship between 
UMPs and bank performance (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). 
                                                          
2This theoretical framework, is particularly relevant in the case of LSAPs, in which financial institutions are 
engaged particularly and thus ‘portfolio balance’ theory is a core mechanism that could explain the impact of 
UMP on bank risk (Steeley, 2015). Tobin (1963, 1969) suggests that central banks could decrease the relative 
returns of financial institutions by shifting supplies of assets with different maturities and liquidity due to 
imperfect substitutability. In particular, when a central bank buys assets from banks, the amount of cash that 
financial institutions hold increases. Since cash is not a perfect substitute for assets, banks  would put emphasis 
in rebalancing their portfolios by purchasing assets that are better substitutes and offer higher yield (Joyce et al., 
2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012). These assets would comprise riskier assets than cash, such as stocks and bonds 
that in turn would increase the undertaken risk of banks (Fisher, 2010; Fratzscher et al., 2014). 
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Montecino and Epstein (2014) find that LSAPs, as proxied by a ‘counterparty treatment 
variable’, increase bank profitability but this effect is robust only for the large US banks. 
Furthermore, Lambert and Ueda (2014) investigate the impact of UMPs, as captured by the 
central bank’s assets over gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, on bank profits for a sample of 
the US commercial banks over the 2007Q3-2012Q3 period. They find that UMPs exert a 
negative effect on bank performance and thus they raise questions concerning the 
effectiveness of expansionary policies on the performance of financial institutions.  
These two studies (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014) do not find a 
strong positive association between UMPs and bank performance. Unconventional monetary 
policies took place in the US after the burst of the financial crisis aiming to boost the wider 
economy, thus when one examines the impact of these policies on bank performance should 
take into account also the regulation framework that is particularly associated with the 
deposit runs of banks. In detail, as a response to the financial crisis, numerous countries 
increased significantly the coverage of their financial safety nets aiming to prevent potential 
contagion defaults in the banking sector. In particular, a recent study by Anginer et al. (2013) 
shows that during periods of normal economic conditions, deposit insurance has a negative 
impact on bank stability, while over periods of economic crisis, deposit insurance coverage 
exerts a ‘stabilization effect’ on banks. Therefore, when we examine the relationship between 
unconventional monetary policy and bank performance, we should also control for the effect 
of the deposit insurance coverage particularly during economic downturns when contagious 
bank defaults are more likely to take place.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, we shed new light on 
the underlying relationship between the UMPs and bank performance as estimated by a 
number of accounting ratios for a sample of US commercial and saving banks over the 
2007Q2-2013Q2 period. Secondly, we test whether the association between UMPs and bank 
performance varies based on different levels of bank asset diversification and deposit 
funding. Thirdly, we examine how deposit insurance coverage relates to the performance of 
banks over this period, while we also test whether the relationship between UMPs and bank 
performance changes for Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage (FDIC)-insured institutions. 
Finally, we use a dynamic panel threshold methodology to identify possible threshold-effects 
of UMPs with respect to bank performance over a period of significant structural changes for 
banking institutions as well as for the entire economy.  
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Our findings suggest a negative relationship between UMPs, as proxied by central bank’s 
asset and excess reserves, and the US bank performance over the 2007Q2- 2013Q2 period. 
The cross-sectional variation identification strategy illustrates that the negative association 
between UMPs and performance is more pronounced for banks of low level of asset 
diversification and high deposit funding. In addition, the negative relationship between UMPs 
and bank performance is moderated for the FDIC-insured institutions. Lastly, the dynamic 
panel threshold analysis demonstrates that the negative association between UMP and bank 
performance is particularly enhanced above the identified threshold value of UMP that 
classifies two regimes.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 introduces the data, while section 4 discusses the methodology and the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses to be tested. 
In this section we develop the three main hypotheses of our study; i) the first tests the 
relationship between the unconventional monetary policy and bank performance ii) the 
second examines the association between the deposit insurance coverage and performance iii) 
while the third looks at the relationship between UMPs and bank performance for deposit 
insured banks. We test these propositions for a sample of the US commercial and saving 
banks over the crisis period (2007Q2-2013Q2).  
2.1. Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Performance 
The existing literature on the relationship between UMPs and bank performance is rather 
limited, while there is a large discussion on the impact of monetary policy via interest rates 
on net interest margins of banking institutions. Following the hypothesis advanced by 
Samuelson (1945), known as the ‘Samuelson effect’, changes in interest rates affect bank 
performance, and more specifically profitability, via their effect on bank’s interest margins. 
In other words, when interest rates are very low, banks’ revenues from loans decline, while 
banks’ interest expenses from saving deposits do not decrease to the same extent, because 
banks’ portfolio consist primarily of demand and transaction deposits. Similarly, Hancock 
(1985) shows that an increase in interest rates boosts bank profitability, as lending rate 
elasticity is larger than the deposit rate elasticity. Trying to bridge a link between UMPs and 
interest margins is imperative to understand the effect of the non-standard monetary policies 
6 
 
 
on the lending interest rates that banks charge borrowers. It is established in the literature that 
UMPs, particularly via LSAPs, decrease long term interest rates and thus decrease the 
difference between the federal fund rate (deposit interest rate) and lending interest rates 
(Gagnon et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and 
Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Therefore, due to the documented larger elasticity 
of the lending rate compared to the deposit rate (Hancock, 1985), the reduction of lending 
interest rates could consequently lead to a faster decrease in revenues than interest expenses 
arising from deposits. This in turn would depress net interest margins and affect negatively 
bank performance. 
Furthermore, one of the leading theoretical models for the determination of interest margins 
is the bank dealership model as developed by Ho and Saunders (1981). According to this 
model, banks are risk-averse financial intermediaries that face inventory risk which arises 
from the mismatch between liabilities and assets. This risk has to be compensated via the 
pure interest spread, the difference between loan and deposit rates. Ho and Saunders (1981) 
suggest that the interest margin is dependent, among others, on the volatility of interest rates 
signifying that high interest rate volatility increases interest margins. A subsequent study by 
McShane and Sharpe (1984) argues that bank’s interest margin is positively related to interest 
rate volatility. In support to the above argument, Maudos and Guevara (2006) confirm 
empirically a significant positive relationship between interest rate volatility and interest 
margins. Following previous findings (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and 
Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013), UMPs, particularly via LSAPs, decrease lending 
interest rates. This in turn suggests that the difference between lending and deposit interest 
rates declines. As a result, when interest rates decrease they tend to converge to zero-low 
bounds and consequently interest rate volatility reduces. Indeed, Krishnamurthy and 
Jorgensen (2011) find that UMP decreases interest rate volatility as captured by the implied 
volatility on swaptions. Therefore, decreases of interest rate volatility over expansionary 
monetary periods could have a positive association with interest margins and bank profits as 
in Maudos’s and Guevara (2006) study.  
Apart from the impact of expansionary monetary policies on interest based income, UMP 
could also affect the performance of banks through its effect on non-interest income that 
stems from trading financial assets. Banks include in their portfolio loans and other assets 
such as securities, commodities and derivatives held for trading. On the positive side, central 
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bank purchases might increase asset prices through the ‘portfolio balance’ channel (Tobin, 
1963; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). According to this mechanism, bank managers and investors 
do not consider cash as a perfect substitute of the MBS and Treasury-bills that bank sell to 
the Fed. Thus, banks are incentivized to use these cash holdings to purchase high return 
assets such as equity and bonds (Tobin, 1963; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). This in turn raises 
the demand of trading assets and their prices and would result in portfolio gains stemming 
from the trading activities of banking institutions. Also, another view suggests that LSAPs 
reduce the market uncertainty and boost the market participants’ confidence in economic 
projections (Wright, 2012) that might result in the increase of asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 
2014). On the contrary, via the ‘signalling’ channel the Fed’s purchases might indicate that 
economic and financial prospects would deteriorate and this might have a negative effect on 
asset prices and bank portfolio gains (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2013).    
Another mechanism through which unconventional monetary policy could affect bank 
performance is through its impact on the funding cost of banks. Banks could benefit from 
near-zero policy rates that would decrease the cost of deposit funding (Lambert and Ueda, 
2014). Turning now to the other form of bank’s funding, wholesale funding cost could also 
be reduced as a result of the unconventional monetary policies. Wholesale financiers 
discipline banking institutions by charging them with higher interest rates than retail 
depositors do (Calomiris, 1999). However, the Fed’s LSAPs are considered by market 
participants as injection of cash to depository institutions and an implicit guarantee for the 
well-functioning of the banking industry (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). In support of this 
argument, Santos et al. (2014) find that banks benefit from a cost advantage with regards to 
raising funding in the bond market, as investors believe that they are too big to fail and thus 
they would discount risk and reduce borrowing cost. Therefore, during non-conventional 
monetary policies banks could benefit from a reduction in interest rates charged by wholesale 
financiers. Other studies (Gagnon et al., 2011; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013), find that banks 
that issue bonds as a form of long term debt can benefit from lower funding costs as LSAPs 
decrease bond yields. Additionally, the Fed’s purchases of Mortgage Backed Securities 
(MBS) from depository institutions, suggest that the central bank might have subsidised 
banks’ funding cost to fund these mortgages (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2015). 
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Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication of the effect of UMP on bank 
performance, thus the hypothesis H1.A and the competing proposition H1.B are formed as 
follows: 
H1.A (H1.B): The effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance is negative 
(positive). 
2.2 Deposit Coverage Insurance, UMP and Bank Performance  
To date, the existing literature is inconclusive with regards to the relationship between 
deposit insurance coverage and bank performance. On the one hand, insured depositors might 
charge lower deposit rates due to the presence of insurance protection (Peria and Schmukler, 
2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). This reduction in deposit rates due to the 
presence of deposit insurance would lead to lower funding costs and this in turn would 
increase banks’ interest margins (the difference between lending and deposit rates) and thus 
performance. In the absence of deposit insurance coverage, monitoring of banks by private 
parties increases and thus uninsured depositors tend to discipline banks by demanding higher 
deposit rates (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Anginer et al., 2013). Moreover, deposit 
insurance could also impact the lending rates positively, as bank managers might lend to 
customers of low creditworthiness suggesting that they would require higher interest rates for 
the loans provided (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). This could 
suggest that deposit insurance coverage might have a positive impact on bank profitability 
through its effect on interest margins. On the other hand, when deposit insurance is in effect, 
the relaxation of credit standards and monitoring procedures could result in a higher level of 
loan losses, thus reducing profits and net interest margins (Abreu and Mendes, 2002).  
Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication of the effect of deposit insurance 
on bank performance, thus the hypothesis H2.A and the competing proposition H2.B are 
formed as follows: 
H2.A (H2.B): The effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank performance is negative 
(positive). 
Drawing from the arguments in the previous section (2.1), one major channel through which 
expansionary monetary policy could affect bank performance is through reduction in the 
interest margins that arises from the decrease in lending rates when the short term rate (fed 
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fund rate) is close to the zero lower bound (Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 
2013). The reduction in net interest margins could be more pronounced for uninsured banks. 
This is so as uninsured depositors discipline banks by charging higher deposit interest rates 
(Anginer et al., 2013). On the contrary, if deposits are insured, depositors lack incentives to 
monitor and consequently charge lower interest rates on deposits (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004). This reduction in interest margins because of the monitoring of depositors 
could be strengthened for deposit uninsured banks. Moreover, at the presence of lower 
margins over unconventional monetary policy periods, insured banks are encouraged to relax 
further their credit standards because of lack of private monitoring and thus increase lending 
to borrowers of low creditworthiness (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 
2010). However, as discussed earlier, lower credit standards for deposit insured institutions 
might lead to a higher loan default rate that could result in bank losses (Abreu and Mendes, 
2002). In this case, the negative (positive) effect of UMP on performance would be 
moderated (strengthened) for banks with deposit insurance coverage. 
Based on the above discussion hypothesis H3.A and the competing hypothesis H3.B would 
be formulated as follows:    
H3.A The positive (negative) effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance 
is strengthened (moderated) for deposit insured institutions. 
And  
H3.B: The positive (negative) effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance 
is moderated (strengthened) for deposit insured institutions. 
3. Data and Variables 
 
We use quarterly financial data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database for a period that 
covers the financial crisis 2007Q2-2013Q2. Our final sample includes 6771 US commercial 
and saving banks and a total of 88,888 observations, after removing errors and 
inconsistencies. Table 1 describes all dependent and explanatory variables employed in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.1. Unconventional monetary policy and deposit insurance coverage variables 
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Since 2009, the Fed has conducted numerous LSAPs rounds that include primarily Treasury 
securities and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In 2014, the Fed purchased almost $2.5 
and $1.7 trillion of Treasury securities and MBS respectively. This had, as a result, the 
expansion of the Fed's balance sheet by almost five times compared with the size of it before 
the crisis. Consequently, UMPs, through LSAPs, have increased substantially both the asset 
and liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet. A number of previous studies highlight that the 
size of central bank’s assets is an appropriate measure of UMPs and indeed is found to 
influence the prices of specific assets in previous studies (Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010; 
Gagnon et al., 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; D’Amico and King, 2013; Gambacorta et al., 
2014), while Lambert and Ueda (2014) demonstrate its significant effect on the profitability 
of the US banks. Similarly, we use the natural logarithm of central bank’s assets (CBA) to 
capture the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet from the asset side.  
Moreover, the expansion of the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet due to the initiation of 
the LSAPs has led to a significant increase in excess reserves held by banks (Todd, 2013).  
Excess reserves stand for the extra amount of reserves against deposits and other liabilities 
that banks hold above the required reserves that the federal law suggests. In particular, excess 
reserves increased sharply since the late 2008 in the US. In 2007, excess reserves averaged 
$1.9 billion, while by April 2014 reached around $1.863 trillion, of which only around $115 
billion are required reserves. This large increase in excess reserves is reflected by its high 
standard deviation (1.04) over the period under study 2007Q2-2013Q2. Moreover, this 
substantial growth in excess reserves has also been driven by an important policy change; 
since 2008 the Fed has started to pay interest on reserves. This, in turn, has encouraged banks 
to maintain a large amount of excess reserves. In addition, paying interest on reserves allows 
the central bank to put a floor on the federal funds rate, as banks would be hesitant to lend out 
their reserves at rates lower than those that they can earn from the Fed (Kozicki et al., 2011). 
This, in turn, offers the ability to the Open Market Trading Desk, ‘the Desk’, at the Fed to 
maintain the federal fund rate very close to the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) 
target rate (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013). Therefore, we also use as a second 
proxy of UMP, the natural logarithm of excess reserves (EXC_RES) as in Bech’s and 
Monnet (2013) study.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Additionally, in order to account for the effect of the deposit insurance coverage, we employ 
a comprehensive dataset that provides bank-specific information on all the FDIC-insured 
institutions. Also, it offers valuable evidence on the particular date that a bank has gained 
access into the FDIC that in turn captures time heterogeneity.3 Thus, we include a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for those banks (and years) that deposits are insured, while takes the 
value of 0 for these banks (and years) that do not have access to the FDIC. The increase of 
deposit insurance coverage is particularly evident the recent years by the mean value of the 
FDIC dummy variable that is equal to 0.65, thus, more than the half of our sample includes 
FDIC-insured financial institutions (Table 2).   
3.2. Control Variables 
We employ a number of bank-specific control variables consistent with a number of previous 
empirical studies. We use the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of each 
bank (SIZE). The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between size and bank 
performance is mixed (Altunbas et al., 2001; DeGuevara and Maudos, 2007). On the one 
hand, bank size might have a positive relationship with bank performance due to higher 
diversification benefits (Mester, 1993). On the other hand, according to the literature, bank 
size could be related negatively with bank performance if economies of scope and scale are 
not realized. We also include the equity over total assets ratio to account for capital (E/TA), 
as in previous studies (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). The association 
between the E/TA ratio with bank performance could be positive, as more capital at risk 
prompts managers to undertake less risky positions that in turn would protect banks from 
increased losses (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, an increase of leverage, which implies a decrease of capital, might have a 
positive relationship with bank performance under the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis introduced by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This is because increases of leverage (decreases of capital) 
could moderate the conflicts that shareholders and managers have with regards to the risk of 
an investment choice (Myers, 1977). When leverage increases the priority of managers is to 
secure funding to pay the debt rather to undertake extremely risky projects (Myers, 1977). 
Hence, high leverage (low capital) might be correlated positively with bank performance, 
consistent with Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). We also account for the relationship 
                                                          
3We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for pointing out the necessity to use an informative measure 
of FDIC that would enable us to capture bank and time heterogeneity. Data for all the FDIC-insured 
institutions are available here: https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp.  
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between liquidity, as estimated by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (LIQ/TA), and bank 
performance. Previous empirical studies show that the association between liquidity and 
performance could be positive due to the lower liquidity risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest that this relationship 
might be negative since high liquidity might be associated with low returns (Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007) and high storage expenses (Kwan, 2003). Furthermore, we opt for the ratio 
of loans to total assets (LA/TA) consistent with previous studies (Pasiouras, 2008; Lin and 
Zhang, 2009; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Bertay et al., 2013). Lastly, we also account for the 
insolvency risk as estimated by the Z-SCORE= (1+ROE)/σROE, where ROE is the return on 
equity and σROE is the estimate of standard deviation of ROE (Boyd and Graham, 1986). 
Higher values of Z-SCORE for a bank indicates higher distance from default and therefore 
we expect that increases of Z-SCORE would have a positive correlation with bank 
performance consistent with numerous previous studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Delis and 
Staikouras, 2011).  
Turning now to the rest of the control variables, we opt for a number of macroeconomic 
variables to capture the general economic conditions.4 Thus, as proxies of macroeconomic 
stability we include in our regressions gross domestic product growth (GDP gr) and inflation 
(INFL) consistent with previous studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Chortareas et 
al., 2011; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014). On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to 
support that favorable economic conditions, i.e. high GDP gr, are related positively with 
banking expenses owing to higher operating costs to offer a particular level of services 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Also, banks tend to increase their lending through shifting 
to riskier assets aiming to rise their returns. This in turn might dampen bank performance in 
the long run (Delis and Kouretas, 2010). On the other hand, GDP gr might be correlated 
negatively with banking costs due to the easy access that banks have to new technologies in 
prosperous countries (Lensink et al., 2008). Lastly, we also include the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans at the US state level (NPLs), in order to capture the state-
specific credit risk.5  
                                                          
4We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer who proposed to introduce variables such as GDP growth, 
inflation and unemployment rate, aiming to capture the effect of general economic conditions on bank 
performance. 
5For the state-level non-performing loans ratio we obtained the data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Regarding the relationship between inflation and bank performance, Revell (1979) claims 
that it depends on whether bank’s salaries and other operating expenses could increase at a 
faster (lower) degree than the inflation rate. Thus, if a bank’s management could predict the 
inflation rate, a bank could adapt interest rates in order to increase revenues faster than costs 
and hence improve bank performance. In contrast, if bank managers could not accurately 
predict the inflation rate that would not result in appropriate adjustment of interest rates. In 
that case, bank costs would increase at a higher level than earnings resulting in the reduction 
of bank performance. Moreover, we include as another measure of economic conditions the 
unemployment rate (UEMP). The association between UEMP and bank performance is 
expected to be negative, consistent with Abreu and Mendes (2002). We also control for the 
interest rate policy in our regression model, including the federal fund rate (Fed rate). The 
relationship between the Fed rate and bank performance is expected to be positive. In 
particular, lower interest rates are positively related with risk-taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; 
Brissimis and Delis, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2013) that in turn might dampen bank performance. 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1.1 Fixed effect estimator 
As a first step of the empirical analysis we run the following general model with the fixed 
effect estimator: 
	, =  + 	 + 	,	 + ∑ 	, +		 ! +"	,#          (1),                                                                    
where 	, is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance 
estimated by four different proxies; 1) return on assets (ROA), 2) return on equity (ROE), 3) 
pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets  (POI), 4) and net interest 
margin (NIM).	 is the constant term,		 stands for the unconventional monetary policy 
independent variable. 	,	 is a dummy variable that captures the deposit protection and 
takes the value of 1 for the FDIC-insured banks, otherwise it takes the value of 0. 
	, comprises a number of bank-specific, state-level and country-level control 
variables, 	 is the unobserved bank-specific effect, while	"	, denotes the idiosyncratic error 
term.	,  and  are the parameters to be estimated. 
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Fixed effect estimator is an appropriate method in the context of our study as we use a panel 
dataset.6 In particular, with fixed effect estimation we take into account heterogeneity across 
banks as it allows unobserved bank-specific characteristics, 	, to be arbitrarily correlated 
with the observed explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, bank fixed effects,		, 
capture heterogeneity across banks as bank-individual characteristics are not constrained and 
could  impact upon the predictor variables. Fixed effect wipes out the impact of time-
invariant characteristics and hence we could examine the underlying relationship between 
UMPs and the rest of our explanatory variables with bank performance. 
4.1.2 Fixed effect panel results 
The fixed effect estimations reveal that the unconventional monetary policy, as estimated by 
two different proxies, has a negative relationship with bank performance in support of our 
H1.A hypothesis. In particular, unconventional monetary policy, as measured by central 
bank’s assets (CBA), has a negative relationship with bank performance across all different 
performance’s measures specifications (ROE, ROA, NIM, POI). In some detail, 1% increase 
of CBA is associated with a 0.890 percentage points decrease in ROE. Similar results we 
observe when we use excess reserves (EXC_RES) as an alternative measure of UMP. Also, 
the EXC_RES has a negative association with bank performance at the 1% level across all 
our regression models (Table 3). Similarly to the CBA specification, if EXC_RES increases 
by 1% we expect a 0.707 percentage points decrease in ROE. Mostly, we observe that CBA 
has a stronger negative association with bank performance compared to that of EXC_RES 
and performance. Overall, these findings reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
UMP and bank performance. These results do not identify directly the exact channels through 
which UMP is related negatively with bank performance. Based on our discussion in the 
hypotheses section, some potential mechanisms could be in play. Briefly, over the monetary 
expansionary periods, the deposit rate (federal fund rate) has been kept at zero lower bounds. 
Also, previous studies find that unconventional monetary policy, through LSAPs, has led to 
the reduction of lending rates (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; 
Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Thus, based on that channel, UMP could affect bank 
performance through the depression on interest margins. Another channel through which 
UMP could be associated negatively with bank performance is through its effect on bank 
asset prices. Market participants could regard Fed’s purchases as a signal of deterioration of 
                                                          
6We use the Hausman (Hausman, 1978) test that rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect 
estimator (and not random effect) is the preferred estimation method.   
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financial prospects which could affect adversely the value of the trading assets and thus the 
portfolio gains of banks (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2013).     
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Turning to the other variable of our main interest, we observe that federal deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) has a negative relationship with bank performance as estimated by different 
accounting-based indicators across all our specifications. In some detail, the relationship 
between deposit insurance coverage and performance is negative and significant at the 1% 
level across the majority of our regression models (see Table 3) lending support to the H2.A. 
This evidence is consistent with the existing literature that loan losses of deposit insured 
institutions could increase due to relaxed credit standards, thereby increasing costs and 
depressing interest margins (Abreu and Mendes, 2001).   
In addition, we go a step further and investigate the association between the interaction term 
of UMP and deposit insurance coverage with bank performance. Our results show that the 
negative relationship between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance, as 
discussed above, is less pronounced for FDIC-insured financial institutions. In some detail, 
the interaction of the deposit insurance coverage with the two alternative measures of UMP, 
CBA*FDIC and EXC_RES*FDIC, enters the regressions positive and significant (Table 3), 
suggesting that the negative association between UMP and bank performance is moderated 
for FDIC-insured banks lending support to the H3.A hypothesis. This relationship is more 
pronounced for those specifications where we employ EXC_RES as a measure of UMP. 
Overall, our findings show that the negative relationship between UMP and bank 
performance is somewhat smaller for the FDIC-insured banks. Although our regression 
model does not detect the exact mechanism through which UMP could be associated 
positively with performance of FDIC-insured institutions, a potential reason for our result 
could be that depositors of FDIC-insured banks might lack incentives to monitor banks and 
thus they charge lower deposit rates compared to that of non-insured depositors (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2004).   
Turning to the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we find that there is a positive 
association between size (SIZE) and bank performance as estimated by the ROA, ROE, NIM 
and POI ratios.  Our finding is consistent with previous literature and thus a potential reason 
for this result could be that bank size could offer diversification benefits through economies 
of scale and scope (Mester, 1993). In addition, we find that the loans over total assets ratio 
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(LA/TA) has a positive and significant  relationship with bank performance at the 1% 
significance level (see Table 3). Our results are also consistent with these of previous 
empirical studies (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Lensink et al., 2008). 
We also observe that E/TA ratio has a positive relationship with bank performance across all 
the relevant specifications (see Table 3). More specifically, this relationship is significant at 
the 1% level when ROE and ROA are used to proxy for bank performance (see Table 3). Our 
finding is consistent with the ones of Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Lepetit et al. (2008). A 
potential reason for this result could be that high level of bank capitalisation might be 
associated with profitable managerial positions which could reduce bank losses as explained 
by Gorton and Rosen (1995). Additionally, we find that LIQ/TA ratio has a negative 
relationship with bank performance. This evidence conforms with previous studies (Kwan, 
2003; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). 
Moreover, we examine the relationship between insolvency risk, as calculated by the Z-
SCORE, and bank performance. Our findings demonstrate, that there is a positive 
relationship between the ZSCORE and bank performance at the 1% significance level (see 
Table 3). Our empirical results are in line with a number of previous studies (Lepetit et al., 
2008; Barry et al., 2011; Delis and Staikouras, 2011). One potential reason for this result, 
according to the literature, could be that banks with high default risk (lower Z-SCORE) divert 
resources from day-to-day to monitoring operations that in turn could increase bank expenses 
and thus reduce banks’ profitability (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Lastly, we observe that 
there is a negative relationship between NPLs and bank performance at the 1% significance 
level across the majority of our specifications (see Table 3).    
Regarding the country-level control variables, we find that GDP growth (GDP gr) has a 
negative relationship with bank performance consistent with previous studies (Yildirim and 
Philipatos, 2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2010). A potential reason could be that higher operating 
expenses to supply a given level of services might be associated with prosperous economic 
conditions (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Moreover, we find that inflation (INFL) is 
related negatively with bank performance in line with previous empirical evidence (Wallich, 
1977; Petersen, 1986; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010) and literature which suggests that 
if bank’s management could not accurately predict inflation rate and consequently could not 
adjust interest rates equivalently, bank expenses increase at a faster pace than revenues 
suggesting the decrease of bank profits (Revell, 1979). We also observe a negative 
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association between unemployment rate (UEMP) and bank performance as in Abreu’s and 
Mendes (2002) study. Finally, we find a positive and significant relationship between the Fed 
rate and performance consistent with previous studies (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Brissimis and 
Delis, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Dynamic panel estimations 
As a second step, we test our main hypotheses (H1, H2 & H3) by employing the two-step 
‘system’ GMM estimator (Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) as in the 
Lambert’s and Ueda (2014) study. The usage of this estimator is appropriate in the context of 
this study as it accounts for endogeneity issues.7 Moreover, the well-documented persistence 
in bank profits (Goddard et al., 2004) is controlled by the inclusion of the performance lagged 
dependent variable amongst the rest of the determinants (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also 
follow the finite sample correction introduced by Windmeijer (2005) as the two-step 
estimates of standard errors tend to be downward biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The dynamic panel model that we use takes the following form: 
	, =
 + $	,%	 + 	 + 	,	 + ∑ 	, + ! 	+"	,#                                                                                                
(2), 
where 	, is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance as 
estimated by ROA, ROE, POI and NIM, while 		,%	 stands for the lagged 
performance independent variable.		 is the variable that captures the unconventional 
monetary policy. 	,	 is a bank-specific dummy variable that accounts for the deposit 
protection and takes the value of 1, while takes the value of 0 for non FDIC-insured 
institutions. 	, includes bank-specific, state-level and country-level control 
                                                          
7For the ‘system’ GMM estimation we use Roodman (2006)  “xtabond2” specification in Stata. 
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variables, 	 is the unobserved bank-specific effect, while	"	, denotes the idiosyncratic error 
term. $, ,	 and  are the parameters to be estimated.  
4.2.2 Dynamic panel results 
Table 4 shows the regression results of the dynamic panel analysis with the central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves, as unconventional monetary policy variables. The suitability of 
the usage of the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is justified by the significant lagged 
dependent performance variables in all the corresponding models (see Table 4). In addition, 
with respect to statistical diagnostics, we observe that the second-order autocorrelation in 
second differences and the Hansen test are insignificant (see Table 4).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Similarly to the fixed effect specifications we observe that UMP, as proxied by CBA and 
EXC_RES, has a negative and significant relationship with bank performance (see Table 4). 
In some detail, 1% increase of CBA and EXC_RES is associated with a 0.581 and 0.102 
percentage points decrease in ROA respectively. Largely, we find that the negative 
association between CBA and bank performance is stronger in magnitude compared to that of 
the performance with EXC_RES. Our evidence lends further support to our fixed effect 
results. A potential reason for the negative association between UMP and bank performance, 
given our discussion on the hypotheses section, could be that UMP lead to the reduction of 
lending rates consistent with previous studies (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley 
and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Also, we observe a negative relationship 
between deposit insurance coverage and bank performance. Moreover, the interactions of the 
deposit insurance coverage with UMP, as calculated by CBA*FDIC and EXC_RES*FDIC, 
have a positive association with bank performance suggesting that the negative relationship 
between UMP and bank performance is less pronounced for the FDIC-insured institutions 
(see Table 4). In addition, we find that the CBA*FDIC has a stronger in magnitude 
relationship with bank performance compared to the association between EXC_RES*FDIC 
and performance. Overall, we find supportive evidence of the fixed effect findings.  
Regarding the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we observe that the results are 
consistent with the fixed effect specifications. In some detail, we observe a positive 
relationship between the SIZE of the bank and performance (see Table 4) consistent with 
Mester (1993). Furthermore, we find that the LA/TA ratio is positively associated with bank 
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performance (see Table 4), as in the fixed effect specifications and previous empirical 
evidence (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Lensink et al., 2008). In 
addition, consistent with the fixed effect estimator, we find that the ZSCORE has a positive 
relationship with bank performance across all our models (see Table 4), in line with previous 
empirical evidence (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Finally, we 
also observe a negative relationship between NPLs and bank performance (see Table 4). 
Moreover, we find that GDP gr, INFL and UEMP are associated negatively with bank 
performance as in fixed effect specifications and previous empirical evidence. Finally, the 
Fed rate enters the regression positive and significant confirming our previous findings 
(4.1.2).  
 
4.3 The relationship between UMPs and bank performance for banks of different asset and 
funding structure. 
In this part, we report findings regarding the relationship between UMP and bank 
performance, whilst taking into account two main US bank-specific characteristics: i) the 
asset diversification and ii) the total deposit funding.8 We split the sample accordingly: banks 
below the 25th, between the 25th and the 75th percentile and banks above the 75th percentile. 
So, we employ three models based on these subsamples, banks of the low, medium and high 
level of asset diversification and deposit funding.9  
Our main motivation for this analysis arises from the fact that the US banking institutions are 
well-diversified institutions in terms of both funding and asset structure. Previous empirical 
evidence suggests that interest based income that stems from loans is less volatile compared 
to the income that stems from non-interest bearing assets, such as derivatives and securities 
(see DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Lepetit et al., 2008). Similarly, banks that rely on trading 
activities experience higher losses compared to financial institutions that focus on traditional 
banking operations (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Also, DeJonghe (2010) demonstrates that 
                                                          
8We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for highlighting the importance of asset and funding structure 
for the US bank performance. We measure asset diversification by using the following formula: asset 
Diversification=1-|(Net loans - Other earning assets) / Total earning assets|, consistent with Laeven and Levine 
(2007). For the level of deposit funding we use the ratio of total deposits over total assets as in Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012). 
9Note that we sort the data with respect to the first year, opting for measures of asset diversification and deposit 
to asset ratio to take into account the intrinsic characteristics of the US banks. In that way, we avoid any 
endogeneity issue arising from bank’s management decisions driven by the macroeconomic conditions 
including non-conventional monetary policies. 
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banks that engage particularly in non-interest based operations are vulnerable to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. These findings illustrate that banks of various levels of asset 
diversification might react differently to changes in the macroeconomic environment, 
including unconventional monetary policies. Moreover, banks that rely more on non-deposit 
funding than deposits could face higher funding costs as wholesale funders could impose 
enhanced monitoring and could withdraw their financing faster than depositors (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Some studies argue that market funding would affect negatively 
the stability of financial institutions in the event of liquidity shocks (Adrian and Shin, 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2008; Diamond and Rajan, 2009). This is so as banks that rely particularly on 
deposits are exposed to lower risk of drying-up in liquidity due to explicit (deposit insurance 
coverage) and implicit government guarantees (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; 2013). 
Given that previous findings suggest that differences in funding structure matter, it is 
important to examine whether there is variability on the relationship between UMP and 
performance of banks of different funding structure. It is, therefore, of interest to investigate 
whether the cross-sectional variation in the asset diversification and funding structure would 
affect the association between UMPs and bank performance. We employ a dynamic panel 
analysis to exploit the cross-sectional variation of our data.10 We include time effects in our 
models implying that we investigate cross-sectional differences of the relationship between 
UMPs and bank performance eliminating time variations.11 This strategy is similar to that of 
other previous empirical studies that highlight the importance of cross-sectional variation in 
identifying differences in the relationship between UMPs and bank characteristics (Becker 
and Ivashina, 2014; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Foley-Fisher et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015).   
 
Table 5 reports that UMP has a negative association with bank performance across all the 
three different subsamples; banks of low, medium and high level of asset diversification. 
Thus, across all subsamples we find that UMP is related negatively with bank performance, 
with the economic significance of this association being similar across banks. Note that there 
is some variation on the significance level of the observed relationship among the three 
                                                          
10As in the previous sections (4.2.1 and 4.2.2), we use two-step system GMM estimation following Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) aiming to account for both endogeneity issues and the documented 
persistence of bank profits (Berger et al., 2000; Goddart et al., 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also use a 
finite sample correction as developed by Widmeijer (2005) as two-step estimates are likely to be downward 
biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Additionally, we use Hansen diagnostic test of overidentifying restrictions 
and the second order autocorrelation test of residuals introduced by Arellano and Bover (1991).  
11We also run the regression including the bank specific and macroeconomic variables (excluding time 
dummies) and we find qualitatively similar results. These findings are available upon request.  
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regression models. In some detail, the interaction of central bank’s assets and asset 
diversification (CBA*ASSETDIV) has a negative and significant relationship with bank 
performance at 5% level in the medium and low level of asset diversification banks, and at 
10% in the high level of asset diversification. In particular, 1% increase of CBA*ASSETDIV 
leads to a 0.316 and 0.301 percentage points decrease in ROA for the low and medium 
subsamples and a 0.289 percentage points decrease for banks of high level of asset 
diversification. A similar picture arises from the regression results where we employ the 
interaction of excess reserves with asset diversification (EXC_RES*ASSETDIV). The 
relationship between UMP and performance remains negative across all banks, but it is 
significant at 1% and 5% for banks that fall within the low and medium level of asset 
diversification respectively. As a consequence, from a statistical standpoint, the negative 
relationship between UMP and bank performance is somewhat less pronounced for banks of 
high level of asset diversification. These results are in line with previous studies where UMPs 
are found to reduce lending rates and thereby to lower the difference between lending and 
deposit rates (Gagnon et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; 
Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Given that banks of low and medium 
asset diversification rely majorly on interest margins for their profitability, a reduction of 
interest margins would be of importance for the performance of financial institutions as a 
whole. Although, the relationship between UMP and bank performance remains negative for 
banks of high level asset diversification, i.e. those of high share of non-interest based 
activities, it is less pronounced from a statistical standpoint.12   
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Turning now to Table 6, we observe that the negative association between the interaction of 
central bank’s assets with deposit to assets ratio (CBA*DEP/TA) and bank performance has 
higher economic significance compared to the results in Table 5, where asset diversification 
has been taken into account. Our findings are consistent with previous studies that find that 
                                                          
12Thus, banks of high level of asset diversification would not be statistically affected by UMP as those banks 
rely on non-interest related assets. As previously discussed in the hypotheses section, UMPs could restore 
market uncertainty (Bekaert et al., 2013; Roache and Rousset, 2013) and increase asset prices (Gambacorta et 
al., 2014). Any positive effect of UMP on asset values could also be explained by the portfolio rebalancing 
theory (Tobin, 1963; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Based on this theory, banks receive cash from the central bank 
and use these proceeds to buy trading assets such as securities. This in turn will give rise to the demand of these 
assets and increase their prices suggesting gains for banks of high level of asset diversification. Thus, those 
institutions that engage particularly in non-interest based assets are less adversely affected by UMP compared to 
banks of medium and low asset diversification.   
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unconventional monetary policy, through LSAPs, is negatively associated with interest rates 
and thus closely related with deposit-taking activities (Gagnon, et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013).    
Table 6 reveals that for banks of high level of deposit funding, that is banks in the subsample 
of high level of deposits to total assets ratio, there exists a stronger negative relationship 
between UMP and performance, as measured by CBA*DEP/TA, both in terms of economic 
and statistical significance compared to banks of either low or medium level of deposits to 
total assets ratio. In particular, CBA*DEP/TA has a negative association with performance of 
banks in low deposit to total assets subsample, but this is significant at 10%. Also, 1% 
increase of CBA*DEP/TA is associated with a 0.920 and 0.673 percentage points decrease in 
ROA for the high and medium subsample and a 0.836 percentage points decrease for the low 
subsample. In a similar vein, the association between the interaction of excess reserves with 
the deposit to assets ratio (EXC_RES*DEP/TA) and bank performance is negative and 
significant at 1% only for banks in the subsample of high level of deposit to total assets ratio. 
In the subsample of low deposits to total assets ratio, again, this relationship is significant but 
only at 10%. Therefore, for banks that rely particularly on wholesale funding this might 
mitigate the negative relationship between UMP and bank performance.13   
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
4.4.1 Dynamic Panel Threshold Model  
As a further step, we opt for a dynamic panel threshold model that enables us to identify any 
regime shifts due to UMPs. In some detail, we build on the dynamic panel threshold model of 
Kremer et al. (2013) based on the cross-sectional balanced panel threshold methodology 
introduced by Hansen (1999). This model identifies changes in coefficients of the main 
regressors of our interest, whilst it detects thresholds and thereby different regimes 
endogenously. In addition, the dataset information would allow to reveal if and when there is 
a break in the data generating process, rather than imposing arbitrarily a structural break in 
the data as in Klapper and Love (2011) and Anginer et al. (2014). This is of importance as, 
during the period of our sample, there is a major financial crisis, but to this date, it is not clear 
                                                          
13As we discussed in the hypotheses section (2.1 Section), wholesale financiers could charge higher interest 
rates than retail depositors aiming to discipline banking institutions (Calomiris, 1999). UMPs could restore 
wholesale financiers’ confidence, as injection of cash to depository institutions function as an implicit guarantee 
for the well-functioning of the banking industry (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). This in turn suggests that banks 
of higher level of wholesale funding than deposit funding could benefit more from a reduction of funding cost 
over expansionary monetary periods.  
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when commercial and saving banks were affected by the crisis. Our model identifies 
thresholds for central bank’s assets and excess reserves and their relationship with bank 
performance over the period of our study (2007Q2-2013Q2). Based on this estimation 
technique, we would be able to identify the exact date of the structural break, and detect 
possible shifts (see Hansen 1999; Kremer et al. 2013).    
The threshold model takes the following form14: 
&	, = '	 + (	,	)*	, ≤ ,- + ./)*	, ≤ ,- + (	,	)*	, > ,- + 1	,             (3), 
 
where &	, is the dependent variable and stands for the ROA.	'	 is the bank-specific 
fixed effect, while (	and	( stand for the two reverse regression slopes based on the 
assumption that there exist two regimes, 1	 is the random error. 	 is a vector of 
explanatory variables that include bank-specific, state-level and country-level control 
variables. . is the regime dependent intercept as introduced by Bick (2007) and its inclusion 
is essential for estimating both the threshold value and the coefficient magnitudes of the two 
regimes.  stands for the indicator function suggesting the regime specified by the threshold 
variable *	 and the threshold value ,. 
The 1	,∗  takes the following transformation: 
1	,∗ = 4 5%5%6 	 71	, − 5% )1	6 +⋯+ 1	,5-:                                                                       (4)   
In the equation (3) the threshold variable is *	, and herein refers to the two measures of 
unconventional monetary policy; i) central bank’s assets and ii) excess reserves. , is the 
threshold value which would indicate those observations above (high regime) and below the 
threshold value (low regime). The above dynamic panel threshold model employs a GMM 
estimation method (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Caner and Hansen, 2004) so as to address 
issues related to endogeneity and avoid the serial correlation in the transformed errors.   
The estimation of the threshold variable follows a two-step procedure; in the first step, the 
estimation of a reduced type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of 
instruments takes place. The predicted values are then used to replace the endogenous 
variable in the equation (3). Next, we estimate equation (3) for a fixed threshold value where 
                                                          
14For simplicity we outline the threshold model based on two identified regimes and one threshold. Without loss 
of generality, this model could expand to more thresholds and thereby more regimes. 
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the threshold variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. Threshold 
values are then specified by the minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors as 
,	∗ = ;<=	>	= (Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Lastly, slope coefficients (	and ( could 
be estimated with the usage of the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
4.4.2 Dynamic threshold results 
If a central bank intends to initiate higher levels of UMPs, through more LSAPs, bank 
investors are more easily persuaded about the future policies of the central bank and thus 
their beliefs that interest rates would remain low for a long period become stronger (Bernanke 
et al., 2004). Eggertson and Woodford (2003) suggest that UMPs could prove to be beneficial 
in decreasing bond yields only if these policies function as a credible commitment by the 
central bank to retain interest rates low. Clouse et al. (2003) suggest that this commitment 
becomes more credible if central bank purchases large volumes of MBS and Treasury bills. 
In particular, Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) find that a LSAP announcement results in the 
lengthening of the expected period of near-zero policy rates. The reason is that if a central 
bank decides to increase interest rates then it would have a loss on these assets 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011).  
Therefore, if a central bank purchases large quantities of long term assets this signals a 
credible commitment that interest rates would be low for a rather longer period of time. This, 
however, could induce bank managers to decrease their lending standards. It is evident in the 
existing literature that low interest rates for a prolonged time soften lending standards 
(Adrian and Shin, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011), suggesting that banks tend to lend 
credit to borrowers of low creditworthiness. This could suggest an increase in problem loans, 
resulting in the increase of bank losses (Abreu and Mendes, 2001). Thus, the negative 
relationship between UMPs and bank performance would be pronounced at higher levels of 
UMPs. Moreover, lower interest rates, as discussed in the hypotheses section, decrease the 
difference between the long and short term interest rates, i.e., interest margins (Gagnon, et al., 
2011; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer 
and Rudebusch, 2013). Therefore, since larger volumes of LSAPs signal longer duration of 
near-zero interest rates, the negative relationship between UMPs and banks’ interest margins 
would be pronounced at higher levels of UMPs in quantitative terms. 
Our results in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions indicate the presence of a 
negative relationship between UMPs and bank performance. Based on these first results and 
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the discussion above, we believe that the negative association between UMPs and bank 
performance would be more pronounced for larger volumes of UMPs compared to that of 
lower quantities of UMPs. Thus, we implement the dynamic panel threshold model 
introduced by Kremer et al. (2013) which allow us to identify the presence of potential 
threshold-effects of the unconventional monetary policy with respect to the US bank 
performance. The potential presence of threshold-effects would enable us to research in depth 
a period of significant structural changes for banking institutions. We employ this 
econometric method by setting as threshold variables two alternative UMPs measures, CBA 
and EXC_RES. 
 
4.4.3 Threshold variable Central bank assets   
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the CBA to be 5.560105 (see 
Table 7). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high 
regime includes all the observations whereby the level of the CBA, is above the 5.560105. By 
contrast, in the low regime belong all these observations for which the value of CBA is below 
5.560105. Our findings suggest that the CBA has a negative relationship with bank 
performance for both regimes. In particular, coefficient estimates on the association between 
UMPs and bank performance are λ2= -4.075 for the high regime and λ1= -2.548 for the low 
regime (see Table 7). In some detail, we observe that the CBA has a stronger, in terms of 
magnitude, relationship with bank performance for banks that belong to the high regime 
compared to those that belong to the low regime. Also, 1% increase of CBA is associated 
with 4.075 (high regime) and 2.548 (low regime) percentage points decrease in ROE. Thus, 
our findings lend support to our expectations that the negative relationship between UMP and 
bank performance would be more pronounced under higher levels of the Fed’s asset 
purchases.   
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Likewise, we also observe a negative association between LIQ/TA and NPLs and bank 
performance. In addition, we find a positive association between FDIC-insured institutions 
and bank performance. We also find that both Z-SCORE and E/TA ratio are associated 
positively with bank performance. Moreover, consistent with our previous findings GDP gr, 
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INFL and UNEMP are related negatively with bank performance. Finally, we find that the 
Fed rate has a positive and significant relationship with bank performance.    
Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that the initiation of unconventional expansionary policies is 
evident particularly in the third quarter of 2008, whereby the level of CBA was increased 
considerably compared to that of the previous period (2007Q2-2008Q2). In addition, we 
observe that the magnitude of the negative relationship between UMPs and bank performance 
in the high regime refers to the 2011Q1-2013Q2 period, suggesting that the destabilizing 
relationship between UMP and bank performance is more pronounced in this period.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Threshold variable Excess Reserves 
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the EXC_RES to be 13.9947 (see 
Table 8). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high 
regime comprises all these observations where the EXC_RES is above the 13.9947. On the 
contrary, the low regime includes the rest observations for which the EXC_RES takes values 
below the threshold value, i.e., 13.9947. Our results show that the EXC_RES has a negative 
relationship with bank performance for both regimes consistent with the previous section 
(4.4.3). In particular, we observe that in the high regime EXC_RES is associated negatively 
with bank performance, as λ2= -3.368, at the 1% significance level (see Table 8). Similarly, 
our findings show that in the low regime EXC_RES is related negatively with bank 
performance, as λ1= -0.428, at the 1% level of significance. Moreover, we observe that the 
negative relationship between EXC_RES and performance is stronger in magnitude for the 
higher regime (λ2= -3.368) compared to that of the lower (λ1= -0.428), confirming our 
previous findings (4.4.3). In addition, 1% increase of EXC_RES is associated with 3.368 and 
0.428 percentage points decrease in ROE for the high and low regime respectively.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, regarding the rest of the variables results are similar to the fixed effect and 
dynamic panel specifications. We find E/TA, SIZE, LA/TA and Z-SCORE have a positive 
relationship with bank performance. In contrast, LIQ/TA, FDIC, NPLs, GDP gr, INFL and 
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UEMP have a negative association with bank performance. Finally, we observe that Fed rate 
and EXC_RES*FDIC enter the regression significant and positive.   
Turning now to Figure 2, we observe a huge growth of the level of excess reserves during the 
period under study. Notably, the level of excess reserves in 2007Q2 is almost half of it in 
2008Q3, indicating that the UMP has led to a significant increase of the EXC_RES. 
Likewise, we observe that the change in the magnitude of the negative relationship between 
UMP and bank performance occurs around the 2010Q4. This illustrates that the negative 
association between UMP and bank performance is particularly evident between 2011Q1 and 
2013Q2 when excess reserves are considerably high.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that the unconventional monetary policy has a negative relationship 
with the performance of commercial and saving banks in the US over the 2007Q2-2013Q2 
period. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with a high level of asset 
diversification and low deposit funding. We also find that the observed negative association 
between unconventional monetary policy and performance is further enhanced for deposit 
uninsured financial institutions. Additionally, the dynamic panel threshold analysis further 
reveals that the negative relationship between unconventional monetary policy and bank 
performance is pronounced above a reported threshold value.   
With regards to policy implications, our findings suggest that the Fed should enhance its 
attention on bank performance while bank managers and supervision should also take into 
account unconventional monetary policy consequences. Along these lines bank supervision 
should be reinforced so as to closely monitor bank performance’s response to unconventional 
monetary policies, particularly for banks with a low level of asset diversification and those 
that rely on deposits, and use this as feedback to the Fed’s decision making.  
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Variables Definition and Sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
A. Dep. Variables     
Return on assets (ROA) Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Bankscope 
Return on equity (ROE) Return on equity/ total assets Bankscope 
Net interest margin (NIM) Interest income minus interest expenses/interest 
earning assets Bankscope 
Pre-tax operating income 
(POI) Pre-tax operating assets/total assets Bankscope 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest   
Central bank’s assets (CBA) Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
Excess reserves (EXC_RES) 
The amount of money that a bank has on deposit 
with the Federal Reserve that is above what is 
required by the Federal Reserve. 
Fed Bank of St. Louis 
Federal Deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) 
Bank specific dummy, that takes the value of 0 if 
banks' deposit are not insured by the Fed while 1 if 
banks' deposit are insured. 
Fed Bank of St. Louis 
C. Other bank-specific    
SIZE Natural logarithm of real total assets   Bankscope 
E/TA Equity/total assets Bankscope 
LA/TA Loans/total assets Bankscope 
LIQ/TA Liquid assets/total assets Bankscope 
Z-SCORE 
(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity 
and sdROE is the standard deviation of return on 
equity (Boyd and Graham, 1986)  
Authors' estimation 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables   
GDP gr Gross Domestic Product (GDP) changes from one year to another Fed Bank of St. Louis 
INFL Inflation Fed Bank of St. Louis 
UEMP Unemployment  Fed Bank of St. Louis 
NPLs Non-performing loans (state level)/total loans Fed Bank of St. Louis 
Fed rate Federal fund rate Fed Bank of St. Louis 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis with respect to 
bank performance. 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. dv. Min. Max. 
A. Dependent Variables         
ROA       0.6 4.47 -72.49    35.51 
ROE       0.03 0.34  -9.93 8.00 
NIM       4.02 2.84 -427.00   406.15 
POI      17.4 15.31 -25.49   194.55 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest       
CBA  5.77 0.23 -5.62 4.6 
EXC_RES      14.06 1.04  7.38 14.68 
FDIC  0.67 0.47 0 1 
C. Bank-specific control variables     
SIZE  12.18 1.34  4.67 21.11 
E/TA    7.94 2.79 -11.75 12.99 
LA/TA  71.80  9.26 50.03 97.14 
LIQ/TA  72.56 13.64 51.68 99.54 
Z-SCORE  -1.27  1.84 -7.94 4.49 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables     
GDP gr  0.51 0.47     -2.11 1.12 
INFL  1.75 0.45 0.73 2.50 
UEMP  8.34 0.89 4.50 9.50 
NPLs  2.74 1.37 0.12 9.32 
Fed rate  0.19 0.52 0.07 5.09 
Notes: our final sample includes 88888 observations after removing all errors and inconsistencies. The Table   
shows the basic descriptive statistics (mean, std.dv., min., max.) of all our dependent and independent variables. 
Our dependent variables are: ROA; ROE; NIM; POI. Our independent variables of our main interest are: CBA; 
EXC_RES; FDIC. Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-
SCORE; Country-level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, Fed rate, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP. 
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Table 3. The effect of UMP on the US bank performance (fixed effect regressions). 
Dependent 
 ROE  ROA  NIM POI Variables 
CBA -0.890*** 
  
-0.384*** -0.154** -0.721** 
(0.255) (0.117) (0.069) (0.318) 
EXC_RES 
 
-0.707*** -0.240*** -0.684*** -0.291*** 
(0.046) (0.030) (0.211) (0.052) 
SIZE 0.982*** 0.996*** 0.559*** 0.572*** 0.163 0.150 0.195 0.137 
(0.301) (0.301) (0.170) (0.169) (0.133) (0.160) (0.553) (0.554) 
LA/TA 0.402*** 0.394*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.331*** 0.313*** 
(0.109) (0.042) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.101) (0.097) 
E/TA 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.026** 0.041** 0.067 0.068 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043) (0.043) 
LIQ/TA -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.755*** 0.760*** 0.819*** 0.820*** 0.093*** 0.111*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 
(0.100) (0.139) (0.107) (0.177) (0.018) (0.014) (0.070) (0.069) 
FDIC -0.308* -0.441*** -0.372* -0.281*** -0.109** -0.149*** -0.952*** -0.313*** 
(0.180) (0.123) (0.215) (0.061) (0.051) (0.045) (0.191) (0.104) 
CBA*FDIC 0.540* 0.770 0.185** 0.161*** 
(0.311) (0.487) (0.088) (0.033) 
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.140** 0.685* 0.655** 0.853*** 
(0.069) (0.392) (0.265) (0.196) 
Fed rate 0.368*** 0.126*** 0.356*** 0.146*** 0.184*** 0.096*** 0.791*** 0.549*** 
(0.100) (0.032) (0.038) (0.025) (0.020) (0.014) (0.059) (0.052) 
NPLs -0.299*** -0.193*** -0.217*** -0.193*** -0.056*** -0.012 -0.009 -0.029 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.040) 
GDP gr -0.176*** -0.257*** -0.013 -0.018 -0.059*** 0.025*** -0.297*** -0.349*** 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.029) 
INFL -0.162*** -0.176*** -0.043** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.676*** -0.644*** 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.042) (0.143) 
UEMP -0.020 -0.092** -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.095*** -0.065 -0.026 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.042) (0.043) 
Constant 1.345*** 2.124*** -1.015*** 7.832*** 4.364*** 2.814 4.389*** 4.293*** 
(0.358) (0.376) (0.235) (2.362) (1.706) (1.946) (0.637) (0.663) 
F-test 75.40*** 76.89*** 90.88*** 94.07*** 85.33*** 63.49*** 130.92*** 134.37*** 
Observations 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 
R-squared 0.140 0.1428 0.106 0.107 0.11 0.127 0.1684 0.169 
Number of banks 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
Notes: the Table shows fixed effect regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; 
Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is 
not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The effect of UMP on the US bank performance (dynamic panel regressions). 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; 
Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is 
not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent ROA ROE NIM POI Variables 
L.Perf. 0.584** 0.572** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.957*** 0.970*** 0.926*** 0.941*** 
(0.248)  (0.244) (0.029) (0.028) (0.169) (0.244) (0.097) (0.197) 
CBA -0.581* 
 
   -0.356*** -0.824* 
 
-0.222** 
(0.332) 
 
(0.071) (0.487) (0.101) 
EXC_RES -0.102* -0.709*** -0.062*** -0.187* 
(0.052) (0.118)  (0.004) (0.097) 
SIZE 0.173* 0.184* 0.204 0.192 0.083 0.123*** 0.300 0.322 
(0.101) (0.107) (0.295) (0.301) (0.081) (0.032) (0.225) (0.280) 
LA/TA 0.107 0.110 0.412*** 0.367*** 0.008** 0.007 0.302 0.274 
(0.081) (0.088) (0.108) (0.110) (0.003) (0.005) (0.454) (0.255) 
E/TA 0.496* 0.494* 0.186*** 0.179*** 0.012 0.012*** 0.180 0.163 
(0.279) (0.282) (0.027) (0.028) (0.010) (0.004) (0.148) (0.139) 
LIQ/TA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.232 0.171 0.787*** 0.765*** 0.056* 0.049*** 0.016 0.045** 
(0.215) (0.136) (0.071) (0.074) (0.028) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) 
FDIC -0.546* -0.210* -0.318*** -0.141*** -0.319 -0.212*** -0.221** -0.179 
(0.328) (0.121) (0.063) (0.036) (0.484) (0.035) (0.110) (0.164) 
CBA*FDIC 0.124*    0.648*** 0.606 0.482** 
(0.072) (0.122) (0.709) (0.239) 
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.263* 0.137*** 0.047*** 0.366 
(0.141) (0.028) (0.012) (0.260) 
Fed rate 0.536*** 0.579*** 0.347*** 0.280*** 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.996*** 
(0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.066) (0.035) (0.011) (0.033) (0.314) 
NPLs -0.124* -0.109* -0.275*** -0.247*** -0.061 -0.056*** -0.621 -0.535 
(0.072) (0.062) (0.086) (0.081) (0.068) (0.010) (0.407) (0.351) 
GDP gr -0.334*** -0.013 -0.091*** -0.797*** -0.079*** -0.072** -0.235 -0.039 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.025) (0.245) (0.011) (0.034) (0.212) (0.029) 
INFL -0.106 -0.011   -0.006 -0.262 -0.018* -0.033* 0.586 -0.541*** 
(0.095) (0.068) (0.005) (0.233) (0.010) (0.017) (0.395) (0.125) 
UEMP -0.040 -0.055 -0.116 -0.205** -0.008 -0.003 -0.121 -0.133 
(0.054) (0.062) (0.139) (0.390) (0.023) (0.002) (0.113) (0.123) 
Constant 1.397*** 3.333*** 1.718*** 2.341** 6.361*** 3.249*** 2.137*** 3.403*** 
(0.105) (0.741) (0.437) (0.394) (0.669) (0.761) (0.536) (0.362) 
Wald test 240.09*** 296.52*** 760.87*** 734.46*** 5892.85*** 113.09*** 493.64*** 511.05*** 
Hansen(p-value) 0.377 0.179 0.522 0.183 0.179 0.146 0.526 0.273 
AR(2) 0.114 0.218 0.316 0.465 0.612 0.327 0.197 0.184 
Number of banks 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel results of the effect of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance 
based on asset diversification classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA Low level of asset diversification 
Medium level of asset 
diversification 
High level of asset 
diversification 
L.ROA 0.428*** 0.365** 0.069** 0.094* 0.179*** 0.196*** 
(0.143) (0.164) (0.021) (0.051) (0.049) (0.043) 
CBA*ASSETDIV -0.316** 
 
-0.301** 
 
 -0.289* 
(0.141) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.159) 
EXC_RES*ASSETDIV 
 
-0.429*** 
 
-0.665** -0.171 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.276) (0.136) 
SIZE 0.189 0.163** 0.028 0.252 0.069 0.374* 
(0.172) (0.071) (0.019) (0.232) (0.045) (0.220) 
LA/TA 0.844 0.367 0.035 0.028 0.136*** 0.019 
(0.751) (0.225) (0.047) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) 
E/TA 0.284** 0.224*** 0.139 0.137 0.184*** 0.163*** 
(0.137) (0.071) (0.091) (0.088) (0.045) (0.062) 
LIQ/TA -0.004** -0.001 -0.014** -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.284** 0.141*** 0.387*** 0.493*** 0.300** 0.615*** 
(0.134) (0.049) (0.108) (0.074) (0.139) (0.114) 
ASSETDIV 0.257** 0.975*** 0.114** 0.876** 0.101* 0.304* 
(0.126) (0.356) (0.044) (0.389) (0.057) (0.182) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.363* 2.834*** 3.544*** 5.444*** 2.993*** 3.139*** 
 (0.176) (0.103) (2.974) (2.118) (0.256) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 176.37*** 111.02*** 154.13*** 1349.46*** 806.59*** 760.11*** 
Observations 22448 22448 36660 36660 29780 29780 
Hansen(p-value) 0.515 0.132 0.185 0.125 0.212 0.462 
AR(2) 0.697 0.180 0.595 0.904 0.381 0.328 
Number of banks 2194 2194 3558 3558 1019 1019 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level of 
bank asset diversification (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our independent 
variables of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES*ASSETDIVE (interaction terms). Other bank-
specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; ASSETDIV. Hansen test stands 
for the p-value of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Dynamic panel results of the effect of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance 
based on deposits over total assets ratio classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA Low level of deposits/total assets 
Medium level of 
deposits/total assets 
High level of deposits/total 
assets 
L.ROA 0.493** 0.509** 0.101*** 0.065* 0.068*** 0.046** 
(0.227) (0.219) (0.016) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) 
CBA*DEP/TA -0.836* 
 
-0.673** 
 
-0.920*** 
(0.503) 
 
(0.301) 
 
(0.159) 
EXC_RES*DEP/TA 
 
-0.210* 
 
-0.325** -0.137*** 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.071) (0.031) 
SIZE 0.131 0.107 0.187** 0.013 0.049 0.081 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.077) (0.085) (0.099) (0.109) 
LA/TA 0.224* 0.231* 0.022*** 0.001 0.003 0.002 
(0.123) (0.125) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
E/TA 0.153 0.130 0.293*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.050) (0.548) (0.032) 
LIQ/TA -0.002 -0.002 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.289*** 0.464*** 0.548*** 0.576*** 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.041) 
DEP/TA 0.402** 0.288* 0.358** 0.181** 0.387*** 0.839* 
(0.192) (0.153) (0.175) (0.100) (0.094) (0.477) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.243*** 2.598*** 2.645*** 6.001*** 2.390*** 3.412*** 
(0.176) (0.243) (0.826) (1.718) (0.146) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 115.29*** 124.85*** 114.56*** 331.94*** 1709.26*** 1699.11*** 
Observations 22963 22963 46465 46465 19460 19460 
Hansen(p-value) 0.141 0.256 0.472 0.530 0.467 0.608 
AR(2) 0.118 0.116 0.219 0.174 0.137 0.231 
Number of banks 1586 1586 3398 3398 1787 1787 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level 
of bank deposits over total assets ratio (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES* DEP/TA (interaction terms). 
Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; DEP/TA. Hansen 
test is the p-value of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Central bank’s assets as 
threshold variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
CBA 5.560105 
95% confidence interval (5.560105-5.560105) 
Impact of CBA                                                    S.E                   
λ1 -2.548*** 0.662 
λ2 -4.075*** 1.019 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.110 
SIZE  0.286** 0.113 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.041*** 0.010 
Z-SCORE  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC 
-1.812** 0.864 
CBA*FDIC 
 0.302** 0.148 
Fed rate  0.144 0.103 
NPLs -0.138*** 0.032 
GDP gr -0.072* 0.047 
INFL -0.010 0.048 
UEMP 
-0.123** 0.055 
δ  0.355** 0.181 
Observations   82117   
Low regime     6384 
 
High regime   75733   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance	&	,, while as the threshold and 
the regime dependent variable we impose the Central bank’s assets (@A which represents unconventional monetary 
easing. Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; FDIC; CBA*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific independent control 
variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, 
INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, 
** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are 
in parentheses. 
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Table 8.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Excess Reserves as threshold 
variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
EXC_RES 13.9947 
95% confidence interval (13.9947-14.2927) 
Impact of EXC_RES                                                    
λ1 -0.428*** 0.112 
λ2 -3.368*** 0.872 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.100 
SIZE  0.303** 0.116 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.039*** 0.010 
Z-SCORE  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC -1.806** 0.620 
EXC_RES*FDIC 
 0.123** 0.043 
Fed  rate  0.148 0.096 
NPLs -0.150*** 0.030 
GDP gr -0.137** 0.047 
INFL -0.181** 0.075 
UEMP -0.162** 0.059 
δ  0.402** 0.181 
Observations 82117   
Low regime 19426 
 
High regime 62691   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance	&	,, while as the threshold and 
the regime dependent variable we impose excess reserves (@A which represents unconventional monetary easing. 
Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: EXC_RES; FDIC; EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific 
independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country level and state-level independent 
variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard 
errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
